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ABSTRACT 
HOW PRIVATIZATION SHAPED THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF RUSSIA AND 
UKRAINE IN COMPARISON WITH SOUTH KOREAN AND JAPANESE EXPERIENCES: 
SIMILITUDES, CONTRASTS AND LESSONS 
by 
Aureliu Sindila 
This paper aspires to motion an explicative correlation between similar patterns of privatizations 
and their effects on corporate governance and its performance. It aims to define historical and 
economic aspects of privatization in Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine; by comparing the initial 
background and reasons for process occurrence. The rationale behind selecting these specific 
countries lies within the shared history along with strong economic ties between countries in two 
by two formats that is Japan and Korea in contrast with Russia and Ukraine. The entire work 
fluctuates around two waves of privatization and three conjectures that target to enlighten both 
direct and indirect effects on corporate governance. The paper is divided into three fundamental 
parts that cover: i) privatization and ownership structure; ii) privatization and corporate financial 
performance and iii) discussions of presumed conjectures. The findings resemble the presumed 
conjunctures that privatization actually shaped higher ownership concentration that in result led 
to diverging corporate financial performance with positive outcomes in two of the 
aforementioned country cases and negative outcomes in others. Therefore, the difference might 
be explained by other factors within the institutional environment, policies for corporate 
governance systems and cultural and societal endowments present in the countries.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has been perceived as a vital area in numerous fields that 
incorporate functions vis-à-vis financial aspects, funding, law, and administration. The concept 
varies alternatively between the nations due to different legislations and institutional frameworks, 
financial settings, social distinctions and development levels around the world. This research 
aims to solidify the differences between privatization processes and their outcomes, basing the 
analysis on the past experiences from Russia, Ukraine, South Korea and Japan. In this 
connection, the corporate governance structure will be the main focus of study. 
In fact, corporate governance in Japan and Korea has been widely researched by domestic 
and international scholars, emphasizing on relative effectiveness of change in terms of 
privatization. In contrast, Russia and Ukraine were mostly regarded as black boxes with relative 
ineffectiveness after the privatization period. In this regard, this paper seeks to analyze and 
structuralize the notion of privatization and how it has shaped corporate governance in four-
country cases. Moreover, there is a distinctive line between Japanese and Korean privatization 
patterns, as well as Russian and Ukrainian; however, these two blocks are expected to give a 
deeper insight of similarities and differences in corporate governance formation. Pro-Asian and 
pro-Russian privatizations have happened due to diverging reasons, which shaped post-
privatization corporate governance mechanisms differently. 
According to previous studies, none of the academic papers discuss privatization patterns 
comparing these four countries. Therefore, this paper would be unique, in a sense that it 
combines two blocks of country cases in order to comprehensively understand how privatization 
stimulated an influential part in the corporate governance of large enterprises and business 
groups. In this regard, the primordial focus of this paper is on privatization, which should have 
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influenced corporate governance structures through institutions and policies for corporate 
governance mechanisms. In order to better elaborate this argument, the paper utilizes a 
qualitative approach, in terms of historical and economic analysis of major events that caused 
current corporate governance structures in four country cases.  
After careful examination of historical events that happened in Japan, Korea, Russia and 
Ukraine during different time periods, this paper highlights two areas, which are considered vital 
in the formation of corporate governance mechanisms. The front one provides attributes about 
the first wave of privatization patterns that shaped ownership structures and concentration of big 
corporations. The further one focuses on the second wave of privatization that hypothetically 
would have altered corporate financial performance, which later on reflected consequences of 
the first wave of privatization. On the basis of these outcomes, this paper excels to investigate 
underlying causes of corporate governance formation triggered by privatization practices in 
Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, this paper is organized as follows; firstly, it 
reviews historical aspects within major events of privatization that shaped ownership structures 
and affected corporate financial performance. Secondly, it analyzes some of the initial causes of 
such change by assuming that institutions and policies could explain the formation of corporate 
governance mechanisms in the selected four countries of our scope.   
The analysis of this research is based on three conjectures. The prime conjecture assumes 
that during the first wave of privatization companies tend to have a higher ownership 
concentration, which influenced divergent paths of pro-Asian and pro-Russian country blocks. 
The second conjecture presumes that due to diffused ownership structures, on average, firms 
perform worse, i.e. productivity is decreased. Finally, the third conjecture argues that mass 
privatization has shaped the diffused ownership structures, which led to poor corporate 
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governance performance. In order to explain objectively the occurrence of these outcomes, a 
detailed historical and economic analysis is presented in this research, so that to assess whether 
institutions and policies for corporate governance are major triggers for shaping corporate 
governance through privatization, notably in countries such as Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine.  
Further sections of this paper are organized in the following manner: literature review of 
country cases; rationale behind choosing these particular countries; theoretical framework; 
additional sections analyze the privatization and ownership structures; corporate financial 
performance; and policies for corporate governance systems. Finally, discussion and conclusions 
are presented respectively.  
This research utilizes qualitative data analysis of secondary data from different sources, 
e.g. companies’ official web-sites, historical repositories, previous research studies in the area, 
opinion of recognized scholars and etc. The study distinguishes two waves of privatization in all 
four cases, i.e. first and second waves, which hypothetically have shaped corporate governance 
in Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine through differences in institutional environment and 
policies for corporate governance. The core aspiration of this research comparison is to 
understand “How privatization shaped corporate governance in Russia and Ukraine in 
comparison with Japanese and South Korean experiences.”  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Studies presented by Gompers et al (2003), Durnev and Kim (2005), Black et al (2005), 
Black et al (2006), Klapper and Love (2004) and numerous alternative researches prove that in 
many countries enhanced corporate governance is connected with a larger company’s estimated 
listed and de facto worth. Conclusively, robust corporate governance proceedings comfort 
directing private supports into beneficial programs contributing to the country’s economic 
development (Claessens, 2006). 
In a substantial number of countries, massive publicly traded companies and firms are 
commonly not widely held, but slightly have dominant shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999), who are entrenched at the control and can assign and screen corporate 
administrators. Moreover, these particular shareholders have the power to expropriate minority 
shareholders, and in addition lenders, within the constraints imposed by the law and this 
tendency have mainly been observed in countries that recently have encountered privatization 
processes. In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolph  Berle and Gardiner Means 
(1932) view consideration towards  a vast “managerialist” compositions on the objectives of 
such managers, counting the essential research of Baumol (1959), Marris (1964), Penrose (1959), 
and Williamson (1964), as well as Galbraith’s (1967) well known and compelling explanations.  
The problem of firms and/or corporations in such countries is not the failure of professional 
managers serving a minority of shareholders (Berle & Gardiner, 1932), but rather the–often 
legal–expropriation of aforesaid minorities, conjointly of the creditors, by regulating 
shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). More importantly, this is the case of some emerging ex-
USSR countries, which recently have started to become more independent, with some of them 
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still being in the midst of transition. By the other side, this is the case of Asian tigers with the rest 
of neighbor countries in the continent.   
Japan 
In contrast, Japanese management styles are more disciplined than western and eastern 
counterparts in pursuing focused development that expands on well-established competitive 
advantages. The recognizing attributes of the Japanese economic structure is the noticeable 
eminence of keiretsu, which are vast corporations that form groups centered on a dominant 
commercial bank. Although driving Japanese organizations have tended to accumulate cash and 
ignore the significance of shareholder distribution, this is hardly a shortcoming limited to 
Japanese companies. Nowadays, the contemporary abundance of keiretsu (large corporations) 
perceives corporations or groups of corporations all centered on a bank, having every company 
commanding abundantly close and convenient cross-shareholdings. For this reason, Japan is 
famous for being a nation where shifts are occurring gradually. Consequently, as a general rule, 
persistence is vital with respect to any presence trying to modify the nation’s status quo. 
However, disregarding the exertion at establishing a corporate governance amendment for Japan 
would conditionally produce its declared goals or not, some of the dynamics appears to have 
prospered in no less than one thing: modifying the discussion.  
Korea 
In Korea, a major reform in 1983 strongly defragmented political assignments at public 
enterprises, that offered managers exceeding autonomy, and offered incentives based on 
meticulous concept of performance evaluation. Furthermore, Korea exalted the reforms and 
pushed ahead with a full-fledged privatization program in the wake of the 1997 economic 
crisis(Lim, 2003). Since early 1998, large-scale administrative transformations for corporate 
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governance have changed, not only the way that Korean firms and financial markets function, 
but also with regards to the fundamentals and dynamics of the Korean society and culture. 
Corporate governance has been a standout amongst the most petulant and effectively examined 
economic, social and legal issues in Korea since the outbreak of privatization. The analysis of the 
chaebols (family owned conglomerates) structure in South Korea is particularly important when 
contrasted to the keiretsu structure in Japan. It is also important to mention elective corporate 
governance instruments in deciding top executive turnover ratios in South Korea, such as the 
importance of firm’s performance, top chaebols connection, fundamental bank ties and 
ownership structure. 
Russia 
An analysis of the Russian corporate governance might provide effective guidance for 
corporate governance theories because the Russian economy manifested poor performance ever 
way back from privatization. In this regard, a vast amount of research on transformation 
economies disclose this low performance primarily in the virtue of a complex scheme of 
bureaucratic interfering, relatively low tax policy regimes, and low human capital development. 
Issues in corporate governance are regularly considered as well, yet less frequently took into 
consideration for further analysis. The affluent array of irregular behavior observed in Russia 
echoes out a structure of distinct pathologies that shows direct linkages between corporate 
governance deficiency and de facto economic effects. In this sense, a study concentrating around 
100 of the biggest Russian companies by Black, Love and Rachinsky (2005) links a considerable 
and statistically significant positive effect of the condition of corporate governance on a firm’s 
market valuation. Therefore, a strong control both safeguards against confiscation by others and 
grants the possibility of expropriating minority shareholders (Bebchuk, 1999). This clarifies the 
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wild conflicts for resources and the escalation in ownership concentration that was gradually 
witnessed in Russia during the period starting from late 1990s to early 2000s. 
Ukraine 
Contextually, the Ukrainian economy provides an interesting case study to analyze. In 
further support of this finding, a big cluster of company operation problems exists, deriving from 
the approach and agility of privatization process; political benefits and availability or absence of 
oligarchic structures; ownership structures along with the existence of minority shareholders; etc. 
Although, there is an augmenting number of companies with concentrated ownership, there is an 
also a vast number of firms and companies with a dominant number of minority shareholders. In 
addition, Zheka (2007) reported in his study, that about 20-30% of companies did not have a 
shareholder, with at least 50%-shareholding in 2000-2002. Another argument that makes 
Ukrainian economy interesting to study is the unprecedented low levels of leverage in the late 
1990s (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, (1999); Myroshnichenko, (2004)).  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework of this paper incorporates findings from previous research studies, 
which emphasize major historical events that shaped corporate governance mechanisms through 
two privatization waves. Therefore, the analysis is grounded on three conjectures, which describe 
the consequences of privatization in Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine. To elaborate, the first 
wave of privatization has affected corporate ownership structure and ownership concentration, so 
that ownership concentration was higher than before privatization. Thus, to support the prime 
assumption, the first section analyzes ownership structures by focusing on major and minor 
shareholders’ concentration of shares in the corporations. Additionally, it considers shareholders’ 
relations, dynamics and trends of privatization and involvement of the state. Another focus is on 
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the second wave of privatization, which supports the assumption that there is on average adverse 
effect on performance. In order to acknowledge this idea, the second section examines financial 
indicators of big companies, compares before and after privatization periods in terms of financial 
performance of firms, inspects effects of privatization on profitability and number of liquidations 
and cases of bankruptcy (if applicable). Finally, the third assumption implies that mass 
privatization has shaped diffused ownership structures that lead to poor corporate governance. 
Therefore, these focus areas are presented in order to give a background overview of situation in 
this four country cases.  
The focal point of this paper is the analysis of underlying causes that can explain consequences 
of privatization waves in Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine. To emphasize the importance of 
institutions, policies and culture in corporate governance systems the third section of this paper 
discusses how institutional environment, policies and cultural endowments affected privatization, 
which shaped corporate governance systems in these countries. Specifically, this paper presents 
overview and analysis of state regulations and policies, government control, judicial efficiency, 
formal institutions and regulatory bodies, as well as state-business relations in four cases. In 
addition, it introduces cultural endowments and society’s peculiarities that hypothetically could 
have influenced corporate governance formation in Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine. In this 
sense, theoretical framework in Figure 1 schematically presents the pathway of this paper.  
Further analysis is structured as following. The paper analyzes historical notions of privatization 
and how it shaped ownership structures and ownership concentration, focusing on large 
corporations that passed through first wave of privatization. Thereafter, the paper examines 
corporate financial performance in the second wave of privatization and drives to the conclusions 
of mass privatization consequences that happened in four countries. The last section analyzes 
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underlying causes of corporate governance formation, focusing on institutions, polices of 
corporate governance as well as society and cultural endowments. Discussion and conclusion 
sections summarize paper findings and outcomes. 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
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I. PRIVATIZATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
The incidence of privatization has been prevalent throughout the history of corporate 
governance formation in Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine across different time frames. Thus, 
Japan, for example, witnessed large scale modernization throughout the second half of the 19th 
century; whereas, South Korea has moved toward restructuring and privatization during 1970s. 
Remarkably, mass privatization in Russia and Ukraine happened after collapse of the Soviet 
Union, in early 1990s. In fact, scholars have highlighted two distinctive waves of privatization in 
the history of corporate governance evolution. The first one is characterized by mass 
privatization patterns, which arguably, has resulted in a higher concentration of corporate 
ownership which this section aims to analyze. It would do so by first studying several notions of 
first wave privatization in four cases and conclude if the first conjecture: “The earlier the 
companies were privatized – the higher the level of corporate ownership concentration” has 
indeed held true.   
Japan 
A totally new era for the Japanese financial system had come into power during the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868. The development of the capital market had created an opportunity to 
finance both the public and business sectors. Thus, at the end of 19th century, the first long-term 
credit banks were established. One of the main objectives of these banks was to monitor and 
support the process of capital accumulation, as well as finance industry development by 
providing long-term loans. However, following the fiscal problems in the 1860s, the Meiji 
Government adopted a plan for aggregate privatization of state-held business enterprises. By the 
“Decree Concerning Factories Sale”, authorized in 1880, it was announced that the firms and 
companies that were fully operational would be relocated for the usage of private investors, in 
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order to encourage both domestic industry and capital reinforcement. In essence, this enabled the 
rise of zaibatsu (conglomerates). In this way, during 1874-1896, the central government realized 
a portfolio summing 26 projects by collaborating with zaibatsu, including: in metal extraction 
(coal, copper, silver, gold mines), cotton and silk spinning mills, shipyards, iron works, and so on. 
The preponderance of the enterprises were later bargained and sold off at preferential rates 
(Kobayashi, 1985, pp. 64-65). 
At that time, the leading merchant families that promoted the economic transformation in 
Meiji era earned the name “political merchants” (seisho) (Morikawa, 1992, p. 4). The political 
merchants, which would become major zaibatsu, can be partite into three groups that 
corresponded to the nature of assistance, which contributed to the Meiji Government: (i) Mitsui 
and Yasuda, accredited to handle national tax revenues, (ii) Okura and Fujita, oriented in supply 
of goods and services demanded by the regime; and (iii) Mitsubishi, which received special 
subsidies for shipping operations (Appendix 1). 
The discussion about governance and organization of zaibatsu is an integral part of this 
paper’s focus, as their formation had a direct effect on the prospective corporate governance 
structure, ownership structure and concentration. In the technical aspect, the main feature of 
zaibatsu was the pyramidal structure, which guaranteed the control over the entire corporate 
network. At the very top of the company was the controlling company (honsha), decisions of 
which then influenced the supplier companies, subsidiaries and dependent firms below. In this 
case, massive trading families circulated stock, an operation that granted permission for 
financing of economic industrialization and establishment of large pyramidal zaibatsu groups 
(Okazaki, 2001, pp. 243-268). In different literature studies, these structures might be presented 
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in distinctly designed models. One of the more known models, the Z Control Pyramid, was 
introduced by Morck and Nakamura in 2004 (Appendix 2). 
In this pyramidal type of structure, the relationship between the actors is very complex. The 
use of this “polished model” was first used by Yoshisuke Ayukawa, the founder of the zaibatsu, 
Nissan. The main thrust of this model is that public and private investors could be excluded from 
the corporate governance mechanism (Morck & Nakamura, 2004). As zaibatsu developed, they 
became more and more complex, creating a strong demand for professional management. 
Historically, before the Meiji Restoration, the groups had been run by professionally-appointed 
managers (banto). In this regard, in order to become exclusive owners in joint-stock companies 
managers would buy disperse shares of the enterprises. 
Table 1. Concentration of Fourteen Zaibatsu Subsidiaries in Heavy Industries  
(Paid-in Capital, 000’s Yen) 
 1937 1947 
14 zaibatsu* 
Total 
companies 
(within Japan) 
14 zaibatsu* 
Total 
companies 
(within Japan) 
Manufacturing and 
mining 2 039 348 25.3 8 056 601 100.0 10 440 200 100.0 22 089 231 100.0 
Heavy industries 985 504 27.3 3 612 502 100.0 7 919 585 54.9 14 430 619 100.0 
Metal 174 478 19.1 911 752 100.0 1 655 406 43.2 3 829 681 100.0 
Machinery 385 312 29.4 1 311 471 100.0 4 302 777 56.4 7 632 409 100.0 
Chemical 425 714 30.6 1 389 279 100.0 1 961 402 66.1 2 968 529 100.0 
* The fourteen zaibatsu are: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Furukawa, Asano, Okura, Yasuda, Nomura, Ayukawa (Nissan), 
Nitchitsu, Nisso, Mori, Riken, Nakajima. 
Source: Morikawa, 1992, p. 234 
The reorganization of zaibatsu occurred during wartime; in 1937, time of the second Sino-
Japanese war, which was followed by World War II in 1941 with the Pearl Harbor attack (Rice, 
1979, pp. 689-706). During this time, a fast development of zaibatsu took place. This was made 
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up of a certain group of zaibatsu who were associated with the development of heavy and 
chemical industries by injecting financial investment expansion directly to the group source or 
by the issue and distribution of shares. This basically allowed other conglomerates to finance 
new capital-intensive ventures while decreasing the prevalent position of current family clans in 
the corporate structure of ownership (Table 1). 
The reforms and zaibatsu dissolution happened later in the postwar period, when Japan was 
governed under the auspices of American Occupation authorities. This opened up advanced and 
modern perspectives and created new channels for development. During this period, the zaibatsu 
family agglomerations modified their ownership structures through the eradication of massive 
private capital investments. This instrumentation profoundly modified the economic and firm 
structures along with the management style at the same time, stimulating the development of 
entrepreneurship and competition. At that time, the largest zaibatsu (Mitui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
Yasuda), together with large machinery and industry firms, including Nissan, Hitachi, Toshiba 
and Toyota were privatized. From 1928 to 1936, the numbers of firms in zaibatsu conglomerates 
were about the same amount of 18 to 20 firms, including other firms accounting for about 150 
companies (Table 2).  
Table 2. Number of Firms belonging to the Zaibatsu 
Year Zaibatsu Others 
1928 20 149 
1929 20 150 
1930 20 150 
1931 21 148 
1932 21 151 
1933 19 149 
1934 19 149 
1935 18 148 
1936 19 144 
Source: Miyajima, Omi, & Saito, 2003, p. 18 
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With the process of zaibatsu dissolution, the large merchant families were replaced with 
individual investors; and in the 1950s, vast numbers of share packets were distributed to banks 
and financial institutions as well as companies of kereitsu groups. In the same period, after Japan 
regained independence and with effective support of the banks, the kereitsu groups Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo were reorganized in new kereitsu (Fuji, Sanwa and Dai-Ichi Kangyo 
Bank).  
Interestingly, the most common division, especially when the arrangement of partnership 
supervision is examined, is horizontal keiretsu (kinyu) and vertical keiretsu (shihon). Horizontal 
keiretsu are non-various leveled gatherings of the principal organizations from prewar zaibatsu 
conglomerates, like Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, which are associated with 
acknowledged relations for a typical primary bank, like Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Fuji; and different 
individuals from the gatherings that are business accomplices or joint-ventures. 
Vertical keiretsu are systems of auxiliaries working inside vast organizations and 
subordinated to them by method of capital and long term generation appropriation relations (e.g. 
Toyota, Toshiba, Hitachi) (Grabowiecki, 2002, p. 81). In this sense, each large Japanese firm 
headed a vertical keiretsu; and in the 1950s, there were only six such horizontal keiretsu. Three 
of them are explicit descendants of the prewar zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo), and 
the other three were established with the ambition deriving from banks. It is important to 
mention that they also trace their origins, less directly, in the prewar zaibatsu (Fuji, Sanwa, and 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo). The horizontal keiretsu appear to be less tightly equalized in comparison with 
vertical keiretsu. Despite the fact that the vertical keiretsu  resembles pyramidal system of 
shareholding and of personnel transfers (from the main company to first-category suppliers, from 
first-category to second-category, and so on); the horizontal keiretsu represents cross-
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shareholding amidst different member companies, thus personnel movements being much more 
constrained, as well as concentrated at the level of the board of directors. The preeminent 
systematization instrument is considered as the ‘president’s club’, which represents a meeting on 
a regular basis of the top managers of the group’s companies. It is mirrored by sets of parallel, 
and less frequent, meetings of functional managers from finance, personnel, and R&D 
departments (Okabe, 2002).  
Vertical keiretsu appears as an essentially distinctive method of grouping in comparison 
with horizontal keiretsu. Oppositely to a comparably looser grouping of different sizes and 
different types of branch enterprises, which are prominent in horizontal keiretsu, vertical keiretsu  
consists of a compact pyramidal relation style with well-defined consolidated executive 
managers. One of the central companies possesses controlling shares in the primary category of 
crucial subsidiaries. Furthermore, each of them holds major controlling shares in its subsidiaries, 
which possess additional segments of controlling shares in another category of subsidiaries, and 
so on. Additionally, this structure is represented by a great intensity of branch specialization. 
Shareholder relations and ownership concentration in Japanese corporations is an interesting 
case of how shareholders are independently classified. In spite of the fact that organizations are 
not formally and lawfully associated, those, which have a place with keiretsu bunches, enter 
entangled frameworks of reliance on interlocking shareholding, intra-group exchanges and 
individual relations. For instance, Japanese shareholders are gathered into independent 
classifications, including monetary establishments (principal banks and other types of banks, 
trust and disaster protection organizations, and stock specialists), mechanical partnerships, and 
singular speculators and outside institutional financial specialists, and also remote speculators. 
Common trade of stock capital (intra-group shareholdings) inside keiretsu is of critical 
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significance for corporate governance, as it secures the organizations against the threat of 
takeovers, permits the organizations’ to observe processes and makes conditions possible for the 
stable improvement of long-term generation of exchange and individual relations (Okabe, 2002, 
pp. 37-39).  
W.C. Kester (1989) accentuates that by rejecting unfriendly takeovers, dangerous capital 
cross-shareholding relations reinforce the position and self-rule of the Boards of Directors of the 
organizations, making a danger of their deft unpredictable, threatening the interests of different 
shareholders of the enterprise. In addition, solid intra-group relations diminish exchange 
expenses. Also, Kester (1989) highlights that the most vital outcomes of capital cross-
shareholding, inside the keiretsu groups, are assorted qualities and a common blend of various 
sorts of corporate possession (claims against an organization), held by different partners of the 
company. The financial advantage, coming from the propensity to keep up money-related 
contrasts and other legally-binding rights towards the partnership, is the abatement of grating that 
may show up in different circumstances between the organization shareholders, in light of the 
fact that each of them holds particular and distinctive rights (Kester, 1989, pp. 24-44).  
Another view on cross-shareholding is expressed by Nakatani (1984) that intra-group money 
and intra-group capital business sector enhancement or “disguise” are shaped. This “disguise” in 
the capital business sector by method of intra-bunch financing and equal shareholding is viable 
in protecting gathering firms from the risk of rivalry in the capital business sector. As a result, 
rates of gainfulness and deals development became lower for organizations with broad cross-
shareholdings, which meant that the variability of these benefits were likewise lower. In this way, 
cross-shareholding is meant to serve as a commonly-accepted protection plan, “in which firms 
are back-up plans and safeguarded in the meantime” (Nakatani, 1984, p. 243).  
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R.J. Gilson and M.J. Roe (1993) accentuated a twofold capacity played by cross-
shareholding in the Japanese organizations, which is checking and generation-supporting. They 
propose to treat keiretsu cross-shareholding relations as a component of checking chiefs, as well 
as creation of structure. Creation of adequacy forms requires groups to significantly put 
resources into connection with specific resources, which are hard to use in another financial 
transaction without an impressive loss of their value. That type of mechanical association is to 
ensure the development of such structures, which gives its associated gatherings the jolts 
actuating them to ideal interest in simply such resources. The circumstances in which the 
gatherings make long term venture of this right, in any case, makes the danger of artful conduct 
of alternate gatherings of the exchange.  
Table 3. Cross-Shareholding of Major Horizontal Keiretsu 
(On Unit and Value Basis, Percent) 
Group* 1987 1999 2000 
Change**
1987-2000 
Mitsubishi 11.16 11.62 9.15 -18.01 
Mitsui 6.35 6.95 4.78 -24.72 
Sumitomo 10.95 9,43 8.46 -22.73 
Sanwa 4.75 4.79 4.07 -14.31 
Fuji 5.27 4.31 3.70 -29.79 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo 6.99 6.32 5.87 -16.02 
Cross-shareholding ratios of the six corporate 
groups (value basis) 
 
28.01 
 
20.36 
 
16.71 
 
-40.34 
Cross-shareholding ratio of overall market (value 
basis) 18.4 10.6 10.2 -44.56 
Intra-group cross-shareholding ratio (value basis) 12.10 9.39 7.47 -38.26 
*Group firms as identified by Nippon Life Insurance 
**Percentage change in cross-shareholding from 1987-2000  
Source: Grabowiecki, 2002, p. 47 
25 
 
The point of legally-binding corporate administration is, accordingly, aside from the generation 
productivity amplification, the minimization of advantage. By the reduction of the danger of 
advantage, cross-shareholding between the organizations does serve ventures checking as well as 
impacts the expansion of interest in particular resources (Gilson & Roe, 1993, pp. 871-906).  
The Japanese example of shareholding is considerably more diverse now than in the mid-
1990s; generally speaking, these are organizations that were recorded in all local securities 
exchanges and keiretsu bunches. Nippon Life Insurance Research Institute (2001) in an overview 
of cross-shareholding highlighted a decrease in cross-shareholding confronting keiretsu. The 
fundamental decisions are presented in Table 3, which uncover that somewhere around 1987 and 
2000, there was a huge fall in keiretsu cross-shareholding both in unit and value premises. In 
terms of subtle element, cross-holding proportions fell 2.01 points to 9.15% for the Mitsubishi 
bunch, 1.67 points to 4.81% for the Mitsui bunch, 2.49 points to 8.46% to the Sumitomo bunch, 
0.68 points to 4.07% for the Sanwa bunch, 1.57 points to 3.70% for the Fuji, and 1.12 points to 
5.87% for the Dai-Ichi Kangyo bunch. In any case, the general cross-shareholding proportion on 
quality premise of the six corporate gatherings was higher than that of the general business sector 
until the end of 2000. 
To summarize the Japanese first wave of privatization, it is essential to mention that the 
early wave of mass privatizations served to control chiefs and influential shareholders, so as to 
secure organizations from hostile takeovers and illegal actions against minor shareholders. 
Interestingly, the more concentrated ownership structure of Japanese keiretsu ensured stable 
improvements in the long-term generation and exchange of shareholders’ relations. Moreover, it 
also reduced the danger of benefits being used inappropriately by major shareholders, through 
the cross-shareholding practice, which emphasized this kind of concentrated ownership structure 
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as a double-check tool.   
Korea 
South Korea is abundantly defined in the existing literature as one of the Asia’s giants. It has 
also remained as one of the world’s rapidly growing industrial powers. In policy terms, it has 
always been characterized by a high degree of government interventions in the market economy, 
which resulted in the establishment of 92 public and quasi-public enterprises. The Korean 
government has taken part in the global movement towards open privatization during different 
time periods and in various economic and political circumstances. It has always been believed 
that a main driver of the South Korea’s privatization strategy of public enterprises was the lust 
for the enhancement of productivity. During the first wave, which dates back to 1960-80 (varies 
from scholar) privatization of government-owned enterprises was perceived as supporting the 
organizational and managerial efficiency by transferring the operability to the private sector. 
This matter had its consequences. The economic growth, which characterized South Korea for 
the last decades, and the strategies used, which were subsidized by government, generated 
companies that dominated the market. South Korea’s giant corporations – chaebols are the 
Korean equivalents of Japan’s zaibatsu.  
A vast majority of Korean enterprises were founded after the end of the World War II. In 
1948, the Korean government established the process of nationalization of the former Japanese 
colonial industries. The nationalized sectors included the railroad, telecommunication, electricity, 
postal services and tobacco industries. The following years were very scarce in terms of new 
enterprise establishments due to the societal disorder and the Korean War of 1950. During this 
devastating period, only 7 public enterprises were established. However, following 1960, which 
was the period under military regimes and the implementation of the five-year plans, the 
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economy seemed more stable, resulting in an establishment of 35 new public enterprises, 
including new sectors of energy, construction and banking (Appendix 3). 
Later on, the financial liberalization period of the 1980s, would take place, backed by the 
government’s realization that the chaebols’ presence was excessively powerful. The only 
solution was an implementation of a national policy for financial liberalization. It was initiated 
form 1981 to 1983, a period when the government initiated the selling procedures of its shares of 
four commercial banks to the private sector. As a result, this process fostered economic growth 
for small and medium enterprises. It was the government, who emphasized credence towards 
market principles and many other private sector initiatives. Despite the fact that this 
liberalization did not solve any of the major problems, it balanced out the economic development 
and increased South Korea’s economic competitiveness.  
According to scholars, the privatization experience in South Korea did not make a 
considerable difference in terms of reducing monopolistic structures or enhancing 
competitiveness. By contrast, it created a beneficial environment for economic development and 
resulted in greater earnings for chaebols. This decade ended with a governmental initiative 
launched in the 1984 that was divided into two missions: (i) deregulating public enterprise by 
allowing them enhanced managerial autonomy, and (ii) allowing individual investors to purchase 
citizens’ shares (Table 4). As a result of the new deregulation policy, the few remaining budget 
deficits in the government owned enterprises were eliminated, thus, generating a wave of 
investment positivism in employee attitudes, quality control and research & development. 
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Table 4. Privatization in 1980s 
Sector Enterprise Year Ownership Method 
Monetary and 
Banking 
Hanil Bank 1981 Sale of assets 
Korea First Bank 1982 Sale of assets 
Bank of Seoul & Trust Co. 1982 Sale of assets 
Chochung Bank 1983 Sale of assets 
Korea Stock Exchange 1988 Citizen shares 
Citizens National Bank 1988 Citizen shares 
Medium Industry Bank 1989 Citizen shares 
Korea Exchange Bank 1989 Citizen shares 
Heavy Industry Pohang Iron & Steel 1988 Citizen shares 
Other Korea Textbooks 1989 Sale of assets Korea Technology Development 1989 Sale of assets 
Source: Kim, Kim, & Boyer, 1994, p. 161 
The Korean government also attempted to commute the transfer of monopolistic government 
assets to citizens (Table 5). This was oriented towards widening the distribution of business 
ownership which had a direct effect on market competition. Direct citizen implication in the 
ownership of public enterprise ameliorated the inefficiencies that afflicted noncompetitive 
enterprises. The government plan to increase the number of individual shareholders in public and 
private enterprises had been ambitious. The government’s 1988 projection was to increase the 
number of shareholders from 1.1 million or 2.6 percent of the population in 1986, to 10 million 
or 23 percent in 1992, so as to exceed the 1985 proportions of shareholders in Japan and the 
United States (Appendix 4). Regardless, citizen proportion of ownership is not likely to decrease 
the instruments of government control inasmuch as the government retains a majority of shares.  
Table 5. The Government’s 1990 Plan for Public/Citizen Ownership after Privatization 
Industry Public (Percentage) Citizen (Percentage) 
Korea Electric 70 30 
Korea Telecommunication 51 49 
Tobacco and Ginseng 51 49 
Medium Industry Bank 51 49 
Korea Exchange Bank 51 49 
Source: Kim, Kim, & Boyer, 1994, p. 162 
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The financial crisis of 1997-1998 was the main driver of major privatization of the public-
owned enterprises in Korea. This was considered as a time when the “big four”: Pohang Steel Co. 
(POSCO), Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction (Doosan H&C), Korea Tobacco and 
Ginseng (KT&G), and Korea Telecom (KT) were privatized. It happened under the Kim Dae-
Jung administration and carries a historical significance for South Korea, as before this period 
only two types of ownerships had dominated the market- the chaebols and the government-
owned enterprises. As a result of this wave of privatization, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
ended up with a more dispersed ownership structure. This mainly happened because large 
portions of shares were sold to broad public, trying to ensure that no single shareholder could 
have a controlling interest in these firms.  
Preceding 1998, the government and the Korea Development Bank (KDB), an entirely 
possessed bank by the government, held 33.6 percent of POSCO shares. By October 2000, the 
government and KDB had been stripped off of all their shares. The Government sold their 
POSCO shares primarily by issuing depositary receipts (DR) to outside speculators. The 
remaining shares were sold to POSCO as treasury stocks. As of December 2002, as a bank 
governmental owned bank, the Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK) possessed 2.34 percent of 
POSCO shares. 
Another instance is the Korea Heavy Industries and Construction which used to be 
claimed by KEPCO and KDB, having owned 40.5 percent and 31.2 percent, respectively. The 
administration completely controlled Korea Heavy by utilizing its overwhelming position as a 
controlling part of the two open enterprises. In October 2000, the Korea Heavy was listed in the 
Korea Stock Exchange and sold 14 percent of its shares to the public. Ten percent of the shares 
were sold to the employee stock ownership association (ESOA). Later in December 2000, 36 
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percent of Korea Heavy shares were sold to Doosan Co., which turned it into the controlling 
shareholder of Korea Heavy. 
Table 6. Ownership structure of Big Four 
Name Shareholders Shares (%) 
POSCO  
(Dec. 2002) 
Largest Shareholder Brandes Investment Partners 3.97 
Other Major Shareholders 
Pohang University 3.34 
SK Group 3.34 
Nippon Steel 3.19 
Industrial Bank of Korea 2.34 
National Pension Fund 2.34 
Sub-total 14.55 
Other Shareholders 
Foreign 54.30 
Domestic 16.48 
ESOA 0.74 
Sub-total 71.52 
Treasury Stocks  9.96 
Total  100.00 
Doosan Heavy 
Industries & 
Construction 
(Dec. 2002) 
Largest Shareholder Doosan 38.20 
Other Major Shareholders 
Korea Exchange Bank 15.74 
Korea Development Bank 12.60 
Sub-Total 28.34 
Other Shareholders 
Foreign 1.00 
Domestic 15.57 
Sub-total 16.57 
Treasury Stocks  17.89 
Total  100.00 
KT&G (Dec. 
2002) 
Largest Shareholder and its related 
parties 
Industrial Bank of Korea 10.75 
Related parties 0.01 
Other Major Shareholders Daehan Investment Trust 7.45 
Other Shareholders 
Foreign 27.01 
Domestic 14.21 
ESOA 6.47 
Sub-total 47.69 
Treasury Stocks  34.10 
Total  100.00 
KT (June 2003) 
Largest Shareholder Brandes Investment Partners 6.39 
Other Major Shareholders National Pension Corporation 2.70 
Other Shareholders 
Foreign 38.00 
Domestic 20.79 
ESOA 6.62 
Sub-total 65.41 
Treasury Stocks  25.49 
Total  100.00 
Source: Nam & Kim, 2004, p. 34 
The Government’s offer in KT&G was near to 100 percent before the onset of the 
emergency. Its proprietorship continued diminishing after the emergency, as a consequence of a 
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progression of government interests in the few banks that utilized the KT&G shares. The 
motivation behind such speculation was to build the BIS proportions of those banks. By October 
2001, government sold all its shares through Initial Price Offering (IPO), issuing DRs, and 
exchange bonds (EB). As of December 2003, the Industrial Bank of Korea still held 10.93 
percent of KT&G shares (Appendix 5). 
Before 1999, the government held 71.2 percent of KT shares. It utilized an assortment of 
strategies to offer KT shares (Table 6). KT shares were sold to outside financial specialists by 
issuing DR, EB, and bonds with warranty (BW). Local delicate offers were additionally 
masterminded. An intriguing shock occurred in May 2002, when government orchestrated a 
residential delicate offer. SK Telecom procured 11.34 percent of KT shares and turned into the 
biggest shareholder of the company. KT clearly did not welcome the acquisition as it showed up 
as a potential takeover risk. The Government additionally contradicted the obtaining as it could 
intensify the business sector fixation by SK Telecom. The contention was settled when KT and 
SK Telecom occupied with two back to back value swaps in December 2002 and in January 
2003. 
The Korean wave of privatization is different from the Japanese situation, in the sense that 
the government distributed portions of shares to citizens, while still owning major shares. This 
was so it could diversify business structure and prevent the most influential shareholders from 
having full control. These actions were attempts to incentivize competition and encourage 
innovation in the market. In this sense, concentrated ownership structure of Korean 
conglomerates was still evident in the first wave of privatization, and refers to the formation of 
corporate governance mechanisms in South Korea. 
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Russia 
The first wave of privatization in Russia refers to the period of after the demise of the Soviet 
Union. In the early 1990s, there were more than 133,000 entities privatized, while the income of 
the state constituted 65 billion rubles. In fact, the entire process of the reassignment of property 
and ownership, in the period following the privatization, was dominated by two major distinct 
but parallel directions (Table 7): (i) further concentration of control in the hands of managers and 
(ii) an increase in the shares of large external shareholders. On a bigger scale, Biletskiy et al. 
(2001), Guriev and Rachinsky (2004), CEFIR and IET (2006) and IFC (2003) and (2005), found 
that ownership was becoming more and more concentrated. Not only had that ownership become 
more fixed and concentrated at firm / company level, but also on individual level (one person 
controlling shares in multiple giant companies). Majority of Russian equity ended up being 
controlled by a small group of people. Respectively, Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) approximate 
that 40% of shares of the biggest companies belong to the Russian branch of the largest 22 
businesses, run by “oligarchs”.  
The IFC (2005) study, and a study CEFIR and IET (2006) found that firms that have the 
Russian-type control of ownership- which refers to a widespread participation of companies in 
the business community- is prevalent. About a third of companies in the IFC and the CEFIR 
studies and IET are members of such groups of companies. According to Lazareva and 
Rachinsky (2006), 18% of firms have large outsider shareholders, where the owners of the 
company are the suppliers and in 18% of the firms, they are also customers (Table 8). 
 
 
33 
 
Table 7. Distribution and Dynamics of Ownership in Russian Firms 
Type of owner 
1994 1999 1994-1999 
Mean share Conditional mean Mean share 
Conditional 
mean Mean change 
State 33.0 59.8 22.6 61.6 -8.8 
Private 67.0 85.9 77.4 91.3 +8.9 
Insider 49.1 65.5 44.4 55.3 -5.1 
Manager 10.6 15.3 14.8 19.8 +2.8 
Worker 35.9 51.6 29.2 39.7 -6.4 
Outsider 17.5 38.5 32.7 52.9 +14.2 
Legal entity 11.1 25.1 19.6 39.4 +7.1 
Individual 4.1 17.7 9.2 24.3 +4.3 
Foreigner 1.5 25.2 3.2 25.8 +1.8 
*survey of 530 industrial firms in 20 regions 
Source: Lazareva, Rachinsky, & Stepanov, 2007, p. 5 
At the end of the 1990s, confiscation of minority shareholders’ rights by controlling owners 
was a broadly spread phenomenon. A pattern is observed where the controlling shareholders of 
different oil companies’ holders have used transfer pricing to reject the earning of company 
profit in intermediaries, hence, avoiding having to transfer them to subsidiaries.   
Table 8. Shares of the Largest Shareholders in the company in 2002-2004 
Shares 2002  % of firms 
2004  
% of firms 
50%+ 19 48 
25%-50% 23 27 
0-24.99% 58 25 
No. of firms 307 442 
Source: Lazareva, Rachinsky, & Stepanov, 2007, p. 6 
Desai et al. (2007) provides an example of “Sibneft” whose production subsidiary 
company would sell a large fraction of the oil it produced, to “the mediators”, named “Runicom” 
at only $2.20. Runicom would then resell the oil abroad at market prices, which have been 
slightly higher (part of the reason is due to tax evasion). Runicom is under the control of 
shareholders of “Sibneft”, but Sibneft is not a significant Runicom shareholder. So once the 
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government took many important steps in 2000 and 2001 to stop Sibneft’s transfer pricing, the 
income earned by minority shareholders started to rise well above industry trends.  
From the other side, cases of confiscation from minority shareholders in the 1990s, 
including Yukos, Sidanko, Gazprom and Sibneft has been well described by Black et al. (2005). 
Though the wave of abuse of rights of minority shareholders has significantly weakened their 
power, but conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders were still very 
frequent. A group of private institutional ventures and minority shareholders of two subsidiaries 
of Mechel Steel Group, publicly denounced and then accused another group for an illegal 
exchange ratio of shares during the process of merger of subsidiaries of Mechel, which had been 
proposed and executed by the management, tossing transfer pricing and a deficiency to publish 
the information to minority shareholder (Table 9).   
Table 9. Board composition in 1998 and 2002 
Shareholders and stakeholders Share in a board at the end of 1998, % 
Share in a board at the 
beginning of 2002, % 
Employees 60.3 56.0 
Including managers 38.5 35.4 
Large individual shareholders 16.5 17.9 
Government (all levels) 5.1 6.7 
Commercial organization (including 
financial) 12.0 12.7 
Non-commercial organizations 1.6 1.5 
Other directors, including independent 4.5 5.2 
No. of firms 278 294 
Source: Lazareva, Rachinsky, & Stepanov, 2007, p. 19 
After vast incidences of hostile takeovers, clashes and conflicts, board composition by 
insiders and outsiders changed significantly in 2005 and 2006. Interestingly, publicly-owned 
enterprises went through much less of an effect of change in composition than privately-owned 
companies. Although, the composition of insider to outsider ratio has shifted in 2006, the shares 
of insiders are still greater than of outsiders (Table 10).  
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Table 10. Board composition in 2005 and 2006 
 75 public 
companies 
17 LSE-listed 
companies 
7 NYSE/NASDAQ-
listed companies 
 2006 
Insiders 66.3 62.5 38.0 
Outsiders 33.7 37.5 62.0 
Representative of minority shareholders 13.9 6.6 28.9 
Representative of strategic non-controlling 
investors 10.9 6.1 27.6 
Representatives of portfolio investors 2.9 0.5 1.3 
Unaffiliated directors 19.9 31.0 33.0 
 2005 
Insiders 70.1 75.0 39.3 
Outsiders 29.9 25.0 60.7 
Representative of minority shareholders 13.9 5.8 33.7 
Representative of strategic non-controlling 
investors 9.4 3.5 31.0 
Representatives of portfolio investors 4.5 2.3 2.7 
Unaffiliated directors 16.0 19.2 27.0 
Source: Lazareva, Rachinsky, & Stepanov, 2007, p. 20 
The case of Russia emphasizes that ownership structure of largest corporations has become 
highly concentrated not only on a company level, but also on an individual level. This notion has 
brought up more effective mechanisms of corporate governance along with issues in distribution 
of power among major and minor shareholders. In fact, individual shareholders who held major 
shares were powerful enough to exercise their power on minor shareholders. During that period, 
a lot of hostile takeovers took place, which led to many distorted corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
Ukraine  
Throughout the contemporary history of Ukraine, ever since its independence in 1991, 
privatization has always gained a spot in the public eye. It is quite natural, if privatization is to be 
considered the basic instrument of social order change- in the transition from Soviet-era 
socialism-witnessing transformations of property of the state into the active capital, forming new 
wealth and repartition of property. 
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It is appears quite complicated to capture a quantitative sense of privatization of state assets 
in Ukraine. Statistical data were not compiled comprehensively, nor organized, and centralized. 
The Ministry of Statistics has not held or issued any inventory on Ukraine medium and large 
enterprises, thus officials of State Property Fund and Western consultants do not even know how 
many medium and large enterprises there are in the Ukraine. There is a list of more than 6,000 
medium and large enterprises, which were subject to mandatory privatization and there was also 
a list of more than 6,000 companies, for which privatization was prohibited (usually enterprises 
of national interest). It is unclear how many other thousands of enterprises that may exist, are not 
included in the list. It also seems that while some companies are double included in both lists, 
some companies on the list may not really be enterprises nor even exist. Similar problems exist 
in the small businesses lists, with estimates of the total number of small businesses, ranging from 
the dozens to the thousands. 
Prior to 1991 and to the beginning of 1992, privatization strengthened legislatively, starting 
first with the concept of de-statization and privatization of state enterprises. The first law was 
adopted in December 1991, and was then followed by another three laws on privatization in early 
1992: “Law on privatization of state enterprises”, the “Law on privatization”, the “Small state-
owned enterprises” (small privatization law) and the “Law on privatization certificates”. 
According to this classification, the enterprises are grouped as follows (Snelbecker, 1995, p. 6): 
 Group A1 - small businesses with the cost of assets less than 33 billion karbovantsi, 
special coupons.  
                                                          
1 The limits for categories often were made to re-index to make high inflation. These limits used here come from the 
draft of Privatization in 1996 and the program of the autumn of 1995. In autumn 1995 the exchange rate was 
approximately 170,000 coupons to U.S. dollar 
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 Group B - medium-sized enterprises, with assets between 33 billion and 2150 billion 
karbovantsi, and assets per employee ratio not higher than 1.5 times the cost of a 
privatization. 
 Group C - medium-sized enterprises, with assets between 33 billion and 2150 billion 
karbovantsi, and assets per employee ratio is higher than 1.5 times the cost of a 
privatization. 
 Group D - Companies that have value of assets, more than 2150 billion karbovantsi, and 
if a company was declared a monopoly, or in the military-industrial complex, or will be 
privatized by foreign investors. 
 Group E - The objects of unfinished construction or liquidated enterprises. 
 Group F - State-owned shares in companies that have a mixed ownership (e.g., partially 
owned by the state and partially private). 
Table 11 demonstrates the privatization of enterprises by grouping in 1992-1995. 
Privatization has been motivated by several macroeconomic stabilization and economic 
liberalization factors. The lack of credit as a result of the government stabilization has 
considerably reduced the incentives for managers to stay in the public sector. Much greater 
financial discipline was required to push the large number of enterprises to private ownership. 
This is particularly true for the agricultural industrialist complex, which continued to draw 
inflationary loans from the state budget. Ukrainian privatization was substantially similar to the 
other schemes in the mass privatization in Czech Republic, Russia, Bulgaria and other countries. 
Different blocks and vouchers were distributed to employees on a systematic basis within 
organized tenders or money auctions, and so on, making it so that there are several particular 
features of privatization in Ukraine that are different from privatization in Russia.   
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Table 11. Privatization of enterprises by group in 1992-1995 
 All SOEs SOEs owned at national level 
SOEs owned at 
municipal level 
Privatized in all groups  
(1992 – 1 July 1995) 14856 5735 9121 
Of which, by %:    
Group A 74.6 44.3 93.5 
Group B, C, D 25.0 55.4 5.9 
Group E 0.4 0.3 0.6 
Planned priv. in 1995 30450 10120 20330 
Of which actually priv. in 1st half 1995, % 10.7 13.3 9.4 
Of which:    
Group A planned 22450 3720 18730 
Group A actual, % 9.6 10.8 6.8 
Group BCD planned 8000 6400 1600 
Group BCD actual, % 13.4 14.7 8.1 
Group E planned 1200 - - 
Group E actual, % - - - 
Source: Snelbecker, 1995, p. 19 
First of all, the (i) pace of privatization has been relatively slow. However, it did not 
improve the situation. It was not unusual for the privatization to take two or three years from the 
sale of the first block to the latter, which increased inefficiency and created inevitable 
management problems. Second, (ii) privatization plans were not fixed as they were in Russia. 
Distribution between staff members and shareholders (insiders) of cash auctions and tenders 
were politically processed which usually allowed the insider to adapt it to benefit them the best. 
It was a particular characteristic of the privatization, during which company plans could change 
several times. 
Another interesting feature is attributed to the fact that (iii) vouchers were not transferable, 
as they were in Russia. Ukrainian citizens could only fill in vouchers justifying their investment 
funds in exchange for the certificates of the fund. These were the only transferable certificates. 
Brokers, however, set up elaborated schemes and purchased vouchers through investment funds. 
As a result, virtually all investment funds were real vehicles for investors, who bought shares 
39 
 
through the accumulation of vouchers. Since the final owners of the majority of shares in 
investment funds were not known, it was arguably not a good idea to rely in any way on the 
funds for partnership in any program of corporate governance. Furthermore, there were a (iv) 
variety of tenders: commercial, non-profit, international. Although foreigners were allowed to 
participate in all types of tenders, the Ukrainians still seemed to somehow have the best approach 
in winning the majority of these tenders. In addition, the (v) government was also in the process 
of selling large stakes in major enterprises. The new official policy at that time, focused on 
foreign strategic investors for these shares. Thus, there was only one major sale: an unfinished 
hydroelectric station to DnisterEnergo acquired by American Energy Systems (AES), a public 
US corporation. Finally, (vi) agricultural enterprises were privatized as well. For the most part, 
the farm employees received shares in the combined farms and / or vouchers of land and 
property distribution of collective farms. 
According to the data provided in Table 12, it is possible to conclude that the proportion of 
insiders’ corporate ownership structure has increased remarkably in Ukraine (from 44 to 57 and 
later 64 percent), whereas, the share of outsiders remained almost unchanged. This means that 
the “industrial” privatization has led the transfer of corporate ownership from the state to insiders. 
Table 12. Structure of corporate ownership in Ukraine and Russia 
Owners Russia Ukraine 1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2003 
Insiders  58 45 34 44 57 64 
Outsiders 33 48 55 36 35 30 
State 5 7 6 20 8 6 
Source: Kostyuk & Koverga, 2007, p. 4 
Increasing the share of insiders in the corporate ownership structure in Ukraine is explained not 
only with the activities of institutional investors, but also with the desire and the leaders of the 
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Ukrainian companies to concentrate corporate control in their hands through the purchase of 
shares by employees. According to Figure 2, the dominant activists structures involved in 
retrieving corporate control were private investors and the leaders of the existing Ukrainian firms. 
As a result, the proportional fraction of managers’ equity in the corporate ownership framework 
during the period of 1998-2003, increased from 6 to 17 percent. Compared with private investors, 
who retrieved the right for corporate control of government, heads of Ukrainian companies used 
leverage private pressure on the employees of companies to make them sell their shares to 
company managers. 
Figure 2. Distribution of corporate control in Ukraine 
Source: Kostyuk & Koverga, 2007, p. 5 
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Therefore, the evolution of specific mechanisms of corporate ownership structure 
consolidation in Ukraine was influenced by two distinct groups of investors. These are the 
management (managers) and company institutional / private investors. It appears to a relatively 
dynamic component in the market evolution for corporate control in Ukraine. Simultaneously, 
the employees were retiring from the corporate ownership network as well. This fact reflects a 
conclusive result of the improvement of the market for corporate control as well, considering that 
the employees in general show less competence in corporate governance. 
This statement might be considered as a conclusion; though only in a limited perspective for 
paths that are used by management to force employees sell their shares. For instance, when the 
executive of the company requires the corporation to gain control through the purchase of shares, 
they would force employees to sell their shares to them. If employees refused to do so, they 
would be fired. Employees were accustomed to keep their jobs, but not their possession. In 
addition, during 2001-2003, the Ukrainian company management began to use another 
mechanism to grab the corporate control-proxy voting. Consistently, the executive comes to the 
general meeting of the works council, which is the primary one, and amend employees who are 
shareholders, to give them power of attorney and control. By doing this way, management 
received corporate control without any investments or costs. 
II. PRIVATIZATION AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The most vivid perspectives on corporate governance is how privatization shaped the 
corporate financial performance in four country cases like Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine. 
Previous literature suggests that privatization had adverse effect on performance, claiming that 
corporate governance effectiveness was deteriorated (Klapper & Love, 2004) (Shleifer & Vishny, 
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1997). This was mainly explained by the fact that ownership concentration was high and usually 
in the hands of major shareholders, who were insiders, thus they had extensive power over 
corporate resources that could be used for the sake of their benefits. Of course, it is hard to 
generalize, however, in case of Russia and Ukraine; privatization played a negative role on 
corporate governance performance. In contrary, Japan and Korea were able to improve the 
efficiency of corporate governance through developing more concentrated ownership structures. 
Therefore, this section aims to highlight the effects of privatization on corporate financial 
performance, assuming that “privatization on average had adverse effect on corporate financial 
performance.”   
Japan  
The concentration of ownership is holds the top surprising attributes of the Japanese corporate 
framework, commonly agreed by many, showing the most compelling instance of partition of 
ownership and control of recorded organizations in the world (Hugh, 2003). In this sense, control 
is for the most part under the influence of administration and shareholding is scattered. The 
shareowners of Japanese firms and companies can be classified into four fundamentally distinct 
groups. The first group is the arrangement of financial institutions, comprising the core bank, 
other center banks, and life and causality insurance agencies, along with different securities 
organizations. When analyzed, collectively they would most likely amount up 20 to 30 percent of 
the shares and exercise a huge function, albeit diminishing in time, as direct supervisors for 
corporate governance direction. The second group incorporates other industrial organizations, 
with smaller rates in possession; yet altogether, summing up to additionally between 20 to 30 
percent. The third group takes in stock close to 25 percent of an organization’s shareholding. It 
constitutes a combination of individual and outside private institutional financial specialists. The 
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last group is made up of outside institutional shareholders and the responsibility for shares of 
Japanese companies possessed by this particular group has increased forcefully to around 20 
percent in late period. 
After duly examination of financial figures, the impacts of privatization on profitability, 
efficiency, and investments are evaluated as positive (Figure 3). Regardless if in fact 
privatization has these beneficial outcomes on the advancement of privatized organizations 
and/or the development of the capital business sector, it is another question whether it affects 
consumer benefit, social welfare, or total scale macro-economic performance. Irrespective these 
impacts are evident or not, it appears to rely upon economic conditions of the concerned business 
sector and country. 
Figure 3. Effects of privatization on firms’ performance in Japan 
Source: Tetsuzo, 2006, p. 160 
Observational outcomes from previous works demonstrated a pattern that keiretsu manifested 
on average lower profitability than non-keiretsu firms and that there are contrasts in the 
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governance mechanism and structure among keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms. As indicated, in 
Japan, the dominant part of substantial firms belongs to keiretsu, together constituting a large 
extent of the Japanese economy. These particular associations of organizations demonstrate a 
business bond with a primary bank, which is additionally independent from the keiretsu itself. 
Within this incorporated structure, the biggest and most notorious keiretsu is the Big Six group 
of keiretsu (in particular, the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Daiichi Kangyo 
bunch). 
Korea  
The common perception of the Korean government, in respect to the public enterprises, was 
that they tend to be less efficient than private ones. Moreover, by producing inefficiently public 
goods they would threat the development of the private sector.  Initially, the vast majority of 
government-owned enterprises were invaded by deficits, prior to after privatization, when the 
companies started producing profits (Table 13). The only exception was shipbuilding, since it 
still remained unprofitable. However, after privatization, most enterprises achieved higher 
returns on investments as well as greater sales per employee. 
Table 13. Deficits/Profits before/after privatization 
Industry Return on Capital (Deficit/Profit) 
Year of 
Privatization 
Beginning Year of 
Profitability 
Korea Shipping Corp. Deficit 1968 1969 
Korea Shipbuilding Corp. Deficit 1968 Still in deficit 
Inchon Machinery Deficit 1968 1977 
Korea Iron Mining Deficit 1968 1971 
Korea Machinery Deficit 1968 1976 
Korea Aviation Corp. Deficit 1969 1975 
Korea Mining and Refinery Deficit 1970 1972 
Source: Kim, Kim, & Boyer, 1994, p. 159 
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The main problem of the improved performance, driven by the privatization, was the 
inequity in the economy and, subsequently, the distribution of wealth. The South-Korean 
chaebols encountered tremendous economic growth, being fueled by advantageous bank loans 
and protecting government policies. Unfortunately, other firms faced trouble competing with 
them in the market thus by taking advantage of the current situation, chaebols expanded their 
total sales and assets. In this context, privatization during the 1970’s was achieved through state 
interventions by credit allocation from the public commercial banks. In this case, transfer of 
ownership after privatization maybe considered as beneficial for the enhancement of productivity 
of chaebols monopolies; yet, their vast performance can barely be attributed to market principles. 
Alternatively, it was rather based on government privileges in taxation and loans, as well as 
government control and regulation. In conclusion, the 1970’s privatization did not contribute to 
the improvement of competition and equitable distribution of wealth; instead it rather fostered 
the inequitable ownership.  
Profitability of the Big Four Korean conglomerates is shown in Table 14. It illustrates 
Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT)/Asset measure of “Big Four” from 1996 to 2002. EBIT 
is utilized rather than net profit, as EBIT is a superior marker of operational productivity. Since 
this information is not accessible amid the period they were unlisted, there are various missing 
perceptions in prior periods. Industry midpoints are figured by similarly weighting the 
EBIT/Asset measure of those organizations with the same 6-digit industry code as per the Korea 
National Statistical Office’s industry classification. The “Big Four” are excluded when 
processing industry midpoints. Likewise firms are dropped, when there is an adjustment in the 
financial year, as it would bend the EBIT measure. In addition, year-end book resource qualities 
are utilized as opposed to start of-the-year book resource values.  
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Table 14. Profitability of Big Four in Korea 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
POSCO 8.82 10.36 9.57 10.56 11.82 8.11 10.63 
Industry 4.15 4.39 4.63 5.42 3.29 3.24 6.32 
No. of firms 21 21 21 21 21 20 18 
Doosan H&C  - - - - 2.32 3.02 4.85 
Industry 7.30 6.04 1.44 3.24 5.55 5.41 9.32 
No. of firms 9 10 9 9 8 10 11 
KT&G - - - 7.06 11.13 12.24 13.46 
KT - - - 2.97 4.08 6.37 8.24 
Industry 9.76 9.33 8.55 2.77 9.09 12.31 12.22 
No. of firms 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Source: Nam & Kim, 2004, p. 35 
For instance, POSCO demonstrates that it has kept up its high productivity even after its full 
privatization in October 2000. POSCO’s correlation bunch, firms in the assembling of 
fundamental iron and steel industry, demonstrates a poor execution compared against POSCO 
through the entire period. In the event of Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction, the picture 
is reverse in this scenario. The cases of Japan and Korea have illustrated that privatization was 
followed by improved corporate governance performance; therefore, the financial performance 
of conglomerates was rather improved than deteriorated. This is an interesting observation 
compared to cases of Russia and Ukraine, which experienced a significant downfall of their 
corporate financial performance.  
Russia 
The main question is whether the privatized entities are performing better in Russia after 
privatization. The answer is presented in figures and facts in the following sections. The 
observations are based on careful investigation containing the sample of Russian manufacturing 
firms, conducted in 1999 and 2000, with reflections looking back to the privatization at the 
beginning of 1990s. The total amount results in 497 firms that evolved from the Soviet planned 
economy and potentially went through the process of privatization during different periods.  
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Information on the condition of sample of firms is provided in Table 15. According to this 
information, 57.6% of selected firms remained active and another 2.5% have also remained 
active but were in the process of bankruptcy at the point of data collection (the beginning 2013). 
All other firms have been liquidated as legal entities during the period between 2000 and 2012. 
The most frequent cause of liquidation (27.1% from the selected firms) was bankruptcy. 
Similarly, for 7% of cases accession to holding company or merger was the cause of liquidation. 
The majority of cases of accession have resulted from the restructuration of power industry 
sector (mainly electricity) in 2005-2008.  
Table 15. Activity status of Russian firms after privatization period 
Status Frequency Percentage 
Active 281 57.58 
Liquidated as a result of bankruptcy 132 27.05 
Legal entity dissolved due to accession or 
merger 34 6.97 
Liquidated due to other reasons 29 5.94 
In the process of bankruptcy 12 2.48 
Total 488 100.00 
Source: Sprenger, 2014, p. 49 
In addition, Table 16 shows the number of liquidations and initiations of bankruptcy for 
every year from 1995 to 2012. The liquidations and bankruptcies rates were amounted as share 
of firms, which were bankruptcies or were liquidated during that year compared to all active 
firms, at the beginning of that year. We noticed that elimination rates have reached the peak in 
2006 this year more than for 8% still of the existing selection firms have been liquidated. More 
importantly, the rate of bankruptcies was the highest for 2001-2005 (from 3% to 5%). It might be 
observed that liquidations and bankruptcy were present, approximately in the same degree 
among the privatized and not privatized entities. Nevertheless, it can be the result of other effects, 
such as industry accessory, profitability, or borrowed funds, in such a way that only a well-
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conducted multidimensional analysis can answer about the relationship and influence of 
privatization on survival rate. 
Table 16. Number of liquidations and bankruptcies by year 
Year Liquidations Liquidation rate (%) 
Initiations of 
bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy rate 
(%) 
1995 0 0.00 1 0.20 
1996 0 0.00 2 0.41 
1997 0 0.00 4 0.82 
1998 0 0.00 4 0.83 
1999 0 0.00 8 1.68 
2000 1 0.20 13 2.77 
2001 3 0.62 21 4.61 
2002 8 1.65 13 2.99 
2003 18 3.78 20 4.74 
2004 18 3.93 13 3.23 
2005 19 4.32 17 4.37 
2006 34 8.08 2 0.54 
2007 23 5.94 8 2.16 
2008 19 5.22 1 0.28 
2009 12 3.48 1 0.28 
2010 8 2.40 5 1.39 
2011 14 4.31 5 1.41 
2012 5 1.61 2 0.57 
2013 2 0.65 1 0.20 
Total 184  140  
Source: Sprenger, 2014, p. 50 
The wave of privatization in Russian companies had an effect on financial performance of 
firms in a way that it resulted in bankruptcies and companies closures. This is, again, explained 
by the high concentration of ownership structure, which worsened corporate governance and 
poor financial performance. It was noticeable that after privatization many companies 
experienced losses and were on the edge of bankruptcy while some decided to close because of 
that. Therefore, we do observe a poorer corporate financial performance of Russian firms after 
privatization.  
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Ukraine 
The increasing share of corporate ownership structure and management of institutional 
investors in Ukraine was accompanied by different transformations in the capital structure of 
Ukrainian firms and companies. In the period from 1998 to 2003, in companies that manifested 
concentrated ownership structure and were lament in the process of the issue of equity, resulted 
in a share of only 6 percent of companies with concentrated ownership structure issuing equity. 
In contrast, companies that were inclined towards dispersed ownership structure brought 
approximately 9 percent of financial resources appearing as issuance of equity (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Structure of financial resources, attracted by companies with concentrated and 
dispersed ownership structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kostyuk & Koverga, 2007, p. 6 
Among the 270 enterprises in the study, the stocks owned by the management amounted 
around 25 percent of shareholders’ assets in a sample of 42 companies. At the same time private 
institutional investors were possessed similar amount of shares in 49 companies, while the 
executive and private institutional investors were holding shares amounting not less than 25 
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percent of shareholders’ equity of the same company in only 9 cases. Aforementioned 
circumstance confirms the hypothesis that management blocking part of the large shareholders’ 
stocks in corporate governance is vital (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). Besides, companies’ 
top executives were trying to maximize the amount of assets but not the company’s income. 
Table 17. Corporate performance with respect to dominant owner 
 Owner 
Managers 
and 
employees 
Individuals Foreign outsiders 
Domestic 
outsiders State 
Average no. of 
employees 1,018 723 2,600 880 4,404 
Average ownership 
concentration, % 50.17 1.99 49.63 32.52 60.37 
Average sales per 
employee 1998, UAH 23,289 5,478 59,072 19,840 39,130 
Average wage per year, 
UAH 1,860 1,159 2,968 1,729 2,393 
Bad receivables change 
1997-1998, % 61.97 82.95 286 1,216.33 130.8 
No. of companies 105 6 35 86 86 
Source: Repeii, 2000, p. 22 
In the incidence of changes in the corporate structure and ownership concentration, financial 
performance of Ukrainian firms went through degradation. It has been observed that state’s 
control over the largest enterprises still has lower financial advancement compared to 
corporations led by foreign investors. The lowest financial performance is observed in 
companies with individual shareholders (Table 17). It is quite noticeable to observe that foreign 
investors are controlling the most efficient enterprises in Ukraine. This is explained by two 
reasons: first, foreigners are prone to acquire more efficient enterprises from the beginning. 
Therefore, maintaining proper level of corporate performance would be a question of continued 
effort of management. Although, a second reason may be attributed to the fact that foreign 
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investors are performing better, in terms of utilization of corporate governance mechanisms. As a 
matter of fact, enterprises led by foreigners tend to be more effective financially.  
In case of Ukraine, the dominance of insider shareholders in the after-privatization period is 
associated with better performance than state and individually owned companies. Interestingly, 
the pay-out ratio in companies where executives are shareholders was not high since 1998 (Table 
18). This was accompanied by the fact that executives would suspend measures for increasing 
net income, in order to keep dividends payable without transfer to other shareholders. Other than 
this, changes in the corporate ownership structure along with capital structure in Ukraine, amid 
the period of 1998-2003, was a passive pace of equity issuing by companies. To emphasize once 
more, executives aimed to maintain corporate control rather than supporting the issuing finance 
projects by issuing equity which resulted in poor corporate financial performance among 
Ukrainian privatized companies.  
Table 18.  Pay-out ratios of Ukrainian companies 
Shareholders group Pay-out ratios, % 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Executives 21 25 24 22 
Commercial banks - - 32 35 
Domestic investment companies and funds 34 37 36 41 
Foreign institutional investors 26 24 27 28 
Domestic financial-industrial groups 35 36 48 57 
Source: Kostyuk, 2005, p. 7 
In sum, privatization in Ukraine has led to weaker corporate governance mechanisms 
followed by poorer financial performance. In this sense, it has been recognized that privately-
owned enterprises performed better than state ones, however, the most efficient cases of financial 
performance were present in the companies with foreign outside shareholders. As a result, the 
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high concentration of ownership structure in Ukraine has resulted in poorer economic 
performance of firms accompanied by weak property rights and formal institutions.  
III. DISCUSSION OF PRESUMPTIONS 
The previous two sections discussed extensively about the two waves of privatization in four 
country-cases. To begin with, all four countries Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine went through 
privatization cycles, which altered corporate governance mechanisms. Factually, the decisive 
role has been played by the government, which had its own goals, the benefits for which could 
be derived either in the long-term or in the short-term. Therefore, Japan and Korea made a 
decision to privatize large conglomerates, i.e. keiretsu and chaebols, in order to improve 
efficiency and performance of major businesses. In fact, Japanese and Korean government aimed 
to weaken powerful major shareholders and to minimize their autocratic influence on corporate 
governance mechanisms, and hence, increase operational efficiency of enterprises. In contrary, 
Russian and Ukrainian cases illustrate how political and economic shock led to privatization 
decision of big enterprises. In the incidence of collapse of the Soviet Union, governments 
accounted huge losses along with inability to repay debts. As a result, the decision about 
privatization of enterprises in Russia and Ukraine conduced to poor corporate governance 
performance. The goal of deriving profits in the short-term to cover losses was achieved; 
however, it led to financial performance problems. This section starts from the discussion of 
similarities and differences of four cases, and aims to conclude upon conjectures.  
The prime conjecture concentrates on the first wave of privatization, and claims that earlier 
privatized companies tend to have higher level of corporate ownership concentration. The 
analysis of economic history of four cases suggests that this conjecture is viable. For example, 
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Japanese keiretsu had cross-shareholding ownership structures, which were highly concentrated 
and served to protect minor shareholders from hostile takeovers. In case of Korea, concentrated 
ownership structure put control over major shareholders, as government had influential portion 
of shares. This decision was made in order to increase efficiency, incentivize innovation and 
technology development. Further, the case of Russia suggests that higher concentration of 
ownership was prevalent in the first wave of privatization, which led to more concentrated 
control over major shareholders and protection of minor shareholders from hostile takeovers. 
Interestingly, in Ukraine the first wave of privatization also resulted in highly concentrated 
ownership structure, nonetheless, major shares were concentrated in the hands of inside 
managers, who used their power to acquire shares from employees with or without their pure 
consent. To emphasize once again, early waves of privatization in all four cases resulted in 
higher degree of corporate ownership concentration, which led to different performance 
outcomes that are discussed later in this section. 
The second conjecture is related to the post effects of privatization on corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate financial performance. It states that privatization on average had 
adverse effect on corporate financial performance. In this regard, the four country cases 
demonstrate different observations. Especially, Japan and Korea has demonstrated improvements 
in productivity and profitability of privatized enterprises. These cases have shown that better 
corporate governance structures resulted in better financial performance of conglomerates. 
Oppositely, Russian and Ukrainian companies went through painful process of bankruptcy and 
financial downfalls. In fact, poorer financial performance of Russian and Ukrainian companies 
was partially a result of highly concentrated governance structures and political and economic 
shocks that happened in 1990s, which government could not handle as to minimize effects of the 
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Soviet Union crisis. In this sense, government-business relations were another interesting and 
important feature of corporate governance formation in Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine that 
are discussed further.   
Referring to the third conjecture of this paper, it states that wholesale privatization created 
diffuse ownership structures that lead to poor corporate governance. The observations from two 
previous conjectures ought to give an idea if this is the case of four country cases. It is interesting 
to note that mass privatization like the ones that happened in Japan and Korea have led to better 
concentrated ownership structures, improved efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms 
and increased profitability of enterprises. Nevertheless, mass privatization in Russia and Ukraine 
has demonstrated opposite consequences, which led to poorer corporate governance and lower 
profitability and, in some cases, even to bankruptcy. To conclude unilaterally, the acceptance of 
this assumption seems doubtful, as two Asian cases and two post-soviet countries had manifested 
divergent results. Therefore, an exploration of this conjecture should be reframed and 
investigated in future research.  
The main questions arising from previously discussed conjectures, would be “How 
privatization shaped corporate governance structure in these countries?” or “What are 
underlying causes or presumptions that led to divergent outcomes of privatization waves in 
four country cases?” In order to extensively analyze causes, this paper focuses on three main 
actors: institutions, policies of corporate governance systems, society and cultural endowments. 
In this regard, further discussion focuses on hypothetical causes that shaped corporate 
governance, through privatization and utilizes analysis of economic history in Japan, Korea, 
Russia and Ukraine.  
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Japan 
In Japan, as well as in South Korea, the state played an important role in reforming the 
corporate governance system. Thus, the policy of the government was directed  to encourage 
flexibility and incentivize Japanese firms to be more competitive in the world markets. The 
development of policy generated very fragmented political actors, where ministries and 
politicians promoted their own interests by focusing on the agenda from the prime minister and 
his office. In this sense, corporations played a significantly important role, pushing officials for 
reforms, and experimenting with new practices. The increase in the number of foreign investors 
in the Japanese financial markets was also an important incentive for carrying out reforms, 
although foreigners and the state kept careful distance from each other. In Japan, the term 
“corporate management” in itself has been understood from a different perspective than in Korea. 
To elaborate, officials in Korea perceived corporate management as a tool for strengthening the 
rights of minority shareholders and weakening ruling power of family-founders of chaebols. In 
contrary, Japan saw “corporate management” as a dilemma between the alteration of Japanese 
style relations with foreigners and the deferment of long-term relations with majority 
shareholders for the benefit of minority shareholders.  
In the late eighties and the beginning of nineties, Japan has plunged into the period of 
economic crisis and stagnation. Asian financial crisis has not stopped Korea from financial 
difficulties as well; nevertheless, the Japanese economy has been shaken from crisis well before 
it reached to the neighbor countries. In this regard, corporate governance was a focal point of 
discussions, which brought changes to the corporate law, finance, financial reporting and 
management of firms. To illustrate, the revision of the Commercial code was one of the most 
important changes in corporate governance system in Japan, which mostly focused on the 
56 
 
relations between management and shareholders. Following this event, the Accounting reform 
has been proclaimed in 1996 with “Big Bang”, which describes the number of steps in order to 
open financial markets for a country and how to become a leading financial center. In turn, some 
politicians were supporters of large business interests. It was especially noticeable in disputes 
over an occasion of restructure and role of boards of directors. Even though politicians supported 
innovative businesses, they have lobbied for the cancellation of accounting rules. More precisely, 
in 2003 politicians pushed to detain part of the overall accounting compliance guidelines, 
particularly to confine the reporting of costs of assets estimated by market value.  
Korea 
Interestingly, in the case of Korea, the IMF and the World Bank explained that diffused 
corporate governance was the initial reason of Korea’s economic crisis. These organizations 
required resolute reforms in corporate structure and business practices, in compliance with the 
“global standard” (Ahmadjian & Song, 2004, p. 5). In the memorandum of economic reforms 
program, the IMF and the government of Korea agreed to increase the ceiling for foreign 
property of the listed firms from 26% to 55% by the end of 1998. Both parties also agreed that 
Korea shall liberalize hostile takeovers and inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Hence, it 
was suggested that the government should not to interfere with credit decisions of banks, not to 
cease salvage of corporations’ problems and to pursue policy of decreasing corporate debt to 
equity ratio of the company. In addition, the IMF recommended developing capital markets, 
reducing importance of bank credits in corporate financing and obliging chaebols to reduce debt 
guarantees of affiliated companies. Thus, the World Bank and the government of Korea have 
signed the agreement with the statement of key policy measures for strengthening principles of 
financial accounting and boards of directors. 
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At the beginning of 1998, during the meeting of elected president Kim Dae-Jung and five 
largest chaebols’ chairmen, five principles were affirmed and accepted: 1) adopting accounting 
reforms increase transparency of management and independent directors, and protect rights of 
minority shareholders; 2) specify debt guarantees among chaebols branches, to forbid new and 
require existing to be cleared by March, 2000; 3) improve financial structure by decreasing debt 
to equity ratio, and removing of not profitable and small entities; 4) concentrate attention on core 
competencies; 5) increase accountability of shareholders of controlling stocks. 
Beside these reforms, Korean government has pursued policies for stimulation of FDI 
inflows. Moreover, in 1998 it liberalized mergers and acquisitions by foreigners, currency 
transactions and introduced Foreign Direct Investment Facilitation Law. By 2002, practically all 
industries, except for broadcasting, have been open for direct foreign investments (Ahmadjian & 
Song, 2004, p. 7). Inward FDI has increased from 3.2 billion in 1996 to $15.5 billion US dollars 
in 1999 (Ahmadjian & Song, 2004, p. 7). One of the most essential changes is obligation to 
introduce independent directors in large listed corporations. Two years prior to crisis, the 
government tried to oblige the listed firms to appoint at least 25% of independent directors, but it 
had to abstain from it due to strong opposition from large corporations (Lee & Oh, 2001). 
However, since 2000 conglomerates have been obligated to have at least half of committee 
members to be independent directors. Later on, in 2001 this requirement was expanded to large 
KOSDAQ market and its listed firms. 
The reform of corporate management in South Korea and Japan has been dispersed in 
process and outcomes. During the finalization process, Korea received more controlled-type 
legal framework along with a set of drastic modifications in financial and ownership structure, 
while Japan received laws which offered firms larger resilience for work in an international setup. 
58 
 
The Korean reform of corporate governance comprised of tough and centralized state with the 
disputable relation with major companies and active and aggressive movement of the shareholder. 
Additionally, the reform of corporate management has been arranged around ideology of easing 
chaebols and encouragement of the rights of minority shareholders. In Japan, the reform of 
corporate governance has been perpetuated by a set of firms operating at the international level 
and the government ministries aimed to provide the Japanese firms more flexibility for work in 
global markets also to react to requirements of global investors. Corporate governance has been 
arranged as a disputable and divisive concept, including a compromise between shareholders and 
employees. The cases of Korea and Japan show as similar categories of subjects, the state, 
corporations, and activists of joint - stock companies, foreigners that have interacted with global 
pressure differently, and led to various trajectories of globalization.  
After considering the differences in formation of corporate governance, a key factor 
determining discrepancies amidst Korea and Japan is the construction of corporate governance 
framework. In Korea, corporate governance centered around the issue of the rights of minority 
shareholders and democracy within the economic structures. In Japan, corporate governance is 
considered as a disputable compromise between shareholders and workers, and also collision 
between the Japanese and American systems. This discrepancy in understanding of corporate 
governance manifested certain consequences. In Korea, frames of corporate management as 
encouragement of the rights of minority shareholders, easing chaebols and promotion of 
economic democracy was leveled reform of corporate governance from the fundamental essence 
of the government policy. Besides, this frame resulted in close coordination in interests between 
the governments, activists of shareholders and foreign investors. In Japan, frames of corporate 
management as compromise could cause damage to the estimated organizations and also it has 
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been connected with slower fragmentary approach from the state, as well as to vigilance between 
the state, activists of shareholders and foreign investors. 
On the other hand, a large distinction on large scale accepted beliefs in Japan and Korea in 
opposition to big businesses. The idea that chaebols have gained excessive power that had to be 
weakened was quite widespread in Korea while there was much less opposing direction in 
respect to large businesses in Japan. It was impossible to tell if there was no anger against large 
business: the Japanese public was shocked by corporate offenses in the 1990s, especially after 
incidents with deception of consumers. Nevertheless, it seemed that there was not enough sense 
of discomfort for the system to be radically changed. 
Russia 
The concentration of ownership and backward development of the financial markets are a 
consequence of the weak legal environment in Russia. Recent researches have shown that it is 
rather strong law enforcement agencies, but not contents of laws that have a crucial importance 
for the firm’s capability to attract external financing (Lazareva, Rachinsky, & Stepanov, 2007, p. 
12). While Russia has quickly caught up with the West in the adjustment of the companies’ acts 
and bankruptcy incidences to the western standards, law enforcement agencies remain at a low 
level (Lazareva, Rachinsky, & Stepanov, 2007, p. 12). This is due to widespread level of 
corruption in courts, monitoring bodies and law enforcement agencies. It is important to note that 
the high inequality of the income, following from weak legal institutes, interferes with the 
demand for good institutions (i.e. those which provide strong observance of the property rights). 
Interestingly, the rich people showed preference towards low protection of the property rights, 
keeping the country in “bad” institutional balance (Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 2003). 
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When the law does not protect minority shareholders, the cost of control becomes extremely high 
(Lazareva, Rachinsky, & Stepanov, 2007, p. 13). In addition, a strong control also insures 
protection against expropriation by others and provides a possibility of expropriation by minority 
shareholders (Bebchuk, 1999). Even more, it explains the cruel wars of assets and the increase in 
concentration of property (and control), observed in Russia in the late nineties and the beginning 
of 2000s. 
Ukraine 
In case of Ukraine, for quite a while, the Law “On Economic Companies” (1991) was the 
fundamental administrative regulatory law, under which JSCs functioned. With regards to these 
records, general shareholders’ meetings, the supervisory board, the official body (administration) 
and the review advisory group were the fundamental collections of corporate governance. 
General shareholders’ meeting was perceived as the supreme body of JSCs having the capability 
and interests for the organization sanctions that may elude different issues supporting the 
occurrence of general shareholders’ meeting with the exception of those stipulated in Article 41. 
Changes and amendments acquainted with the law “On Economic Companies” in 1997, resolved 
the circle of angles containing selected permissions of general shareholders’ gatherings and these 
issues cannot be assigned for thought and determination in different assortments of JSCs.  
In 2004, the Civil Code presented a novel tenet managing irreconcilable circumstance 
exchanges between the organization and the shareholder. This tenet required that a shareholder 
does not have the privilege to vote at the general shareholders’ meeting on choices as to 
exchange or debate between the organization and those shareholders. Similarly, these records 
establish the legitimate framework for sorting out and working entrepreneurial subjects as 
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substances directed by private law. They additionally characterize the particular qualities of 
stock organizations. The need to actualize uncommon law, which could control every part of 
JSCs’ action was brought on by the way that “On Economic Companies” law in 1991 didn’t give 
the insurance for both major and minor shareholders. Thus, this tenet proved unable to 
successfully direct matters emerging in the corporate administration preparation that created 
various corporate clashes. 
In fact, government-businesses interaction throughout the process of privatization was 
backed up with policies and institutions that formed corporate governance systems in Japan, 
Korea, Russia and Ukraine. These policies have actually formed corporate governance 
mechanisms in large businesses that influenced the efficiency of corporate governance systems 
and hence enterprises’ financial performance. From the state initiatives and initiation of 
decisions, the corporate governance formation has started accompanied by the privatization in 
two distinctive waves, which had different effects in both long-term and short term corporate 
performances.  
In attempt to answer why corporate governance mechanisms might differ across selected 
country cases, it is important to mention cultural and societal endowments present in the country. 
For example, Japanese and Korean society and culture have different from the West values, 
norms and unspoken rules. In contrast, Ukraine and Russia are following more Westernized 
patterns of societal and cultural formation. To understand why corporate governance 
mechanisms are different in selected countries, it is vital to highlight differences in culture.  
Japan has been influenced by Confucianism, which advocates for societal well-being as a 
primary value, rather than individual welfare (Pejovic); (Nam & Kim, 2004). Following the path 
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of Japan, Korea, as well, has adopted cultural values of Confucianism society represented in 
group mentality approach. Could the societal approach for building common welfare be reflected 
in corporate governance structures in Japan and Korea? In the process of privatization, 
government tried to consider all parties involved in the process, so that the consequences of this 
process would lead to improved corporate financial performance of big corporations. Even 
though the distribution of shares was highly concentrated at the end of privatization process, 
corporate financial performance in Japan and Korea has been significantly improved showing 
more efficient patterns of productivity and profitability.  
In contrary, cases of Russia and Ukraine are oppositely different from Japanese and Korean 
cases. Shevchenko (2016) mentioned in his work that Russian companies lack the system of 
cultural norms and rules, which would bring cohesion and consistency to corporate governance 
mechanisms. Shevchenko (2016) has noticed that cultural and societal norms and rules directly 
influence corporate governance performance. In this regard, cultural endowments in Russian 
firms are less sophisticated that in Japan and Korea, and that may explain the difference in 
divergent paths of corporate financial performance in selected countries. Russia and Ukraine 
have been mostly following Western cultural values and that probably have shaped the society, 
which is more individualistic and might sacrifice societal norms for individual benefits. This is 
exactly what happened during privatization in Russia and Ukraine, when individual shareholders 
used their power to take over corporations at the expense of minority shareholders.  
To conclude, corporate governance formation in Japan, Korea, Russia and Ukraine has been 
shaped by different channels through privatization, which happened during different periods. To 
understand how privatization influenced corporate governance mechanisms, two areas are 
identified by historical and economic analyses: privatization and ownership structure and 
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ownership concentration as well privatization and corporate financial performance. In all four 
country cases after privatization period was characterized by highly concentrated ownership 
structures. However, in the process of analyzing corporate financial performance after 
privatization, results are diverging. Thus, Japanese and Korean firms have significantly improved 
their corporate financial performance, while Russia and Ukraine experience significant downfall 
in the later. These divergent results should be explained by other factors, like institutional 
environment, policies for corporate governance mechanisms, cultural and societal endowments 
discussed in this section 
  
64 
 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to explain why the relationship between ownership and corporate 
governance manifests different patterns across countries. One of the factors that might be 
relevant to consider is the impact of the privatization period and the recurrent Asian financial 
crisis on ownership distribution. Additionally, the differences may be related to legal frameworks 
and country’s institutional environment; therefore, analyzing the effects of these factors is a 
subject meant to fill the gap in the current research literature. Nonetheless, the existing literature 
does not particularly examine the contrast between ex-USSR and Asian countries, which might 
provide solid and significant explanations and contribute with additional valuable lessons.  
The Russian case is centered around two distinct initial conditions closely related to 
uneconomic company boundaries that acted in competition with different groups of inside 
owners. This fact offers a large span for further research. It is also important to mention that 
Russian progress within corporate governance frameworks is unique, in a sense that in offers a 
great deal of creative corporate governance pathologies combined with unusual boundaries 
within the competing insiders for firms' control.  
Nevertheless, the lessons that Russia provides are meant to be used for improvement our 
essential comprehension of how executive management and corporate governance functions. 
When analyzed in parallel perspective, ownership structure delivers an important causation of 
corporate governance in Russia and Ukraine, thus, ownership concentrations, rather than the 
need for outside liquidity, appear to influence corporate governance decisions of firms. As for 
the Asian case, compared to Japan’s keiretsu, direct government policy seems to have played a 
considerable decisive part in the rise of Korea’s chaebols.  
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The aforementioned differences appear to be playing a critical role in on risk sharing in 
the credit market. In Japan, it is the main bank that invigilates borrowers as a quasi-insider to 
keiretsu affiliate firms, whereas in Korea, it is the government that controls the stream of credit 
and, therefore, acts as the de facto monitor of corporate borrowers. There are indications of 
detaching ties in between rather than within the keiretsu firms in Japan, mainly caused by the 
drastic internationalization of the financial frameworks that reshaped in a negative manner the 
role of the core banks. Oppositely, Korea will tend to manifest an impressive development 
strategy aimed to promote selected enterprises within industries.  
At the firm level, corporate governance seem to play an important role when determining: 
the access to finance, expenses of capital, valuation and management execution.  Better corporate 
governance prompts higher profits on equity and greater efficiency. Amidst the mentioned 
countries the contractual and legal frameworks have been perceived as underscored by corporate 
governance and financial literature. 
With overall significance of corporate governance being instituted, the general expertise 
on divergent and distinct channels of influence is still week. The general significance of 
corporate governance has been instituted; expertise on distinct issues or channels is still weak. 
Similarly, an important general caveat to the literature is that there is still some way to go to 
address causality. In this regard, this also applies to the following three areas: (i) ownership 
structures; (ii) the relationship with performance and governance mechanism corporate 
governance and stakeholders’ roles; and (iii) enforcement, both public and private, and related 
changes in the corporate governance environment as well as cultural and societal settings. 
Furthermore, this issue might be addressed by reviewing the main mechanisms of corporate 
governance in these countries and relate them to firms’ ownership structures.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Group-specific Origins in 19th Century Japan 
 Origins  Growth and relations with government 
Mitsui* 
Dates back to 1673; “political 
merchants” who provided financial 
services to the Tokugawa regime since 
the late 17th century 
Historically close ties to various governments. 
Growth and diversification through acquisitions, 
in part through establishment of new business, in 
part through government privatization and 
contracts 
Mitsubishi* Founded by a former Samurai after the Meiji Restoration 
Initially investment in shipping enjoyed 
government protection, subsidies, loans etc. 
Subsequent growth and diversification patterns 
broadly similar to Mitsui’s 
Sumitomo* Dates back to the late 16
th century with 
ties to the Tokugawa regime 
Diversified from mining into trading, finance, 
and industry. Diversification and growth through 
both acquisitions and through the establishment 
of new business, with government support 
Yasuda* 
“Political merchants” from the Meiji 
Restoration period. Mainly provided 
financial services (including the 
establishment of the third national 
bank in 1876)  
Less diversified than the other large groups more 
focused on banking and finance. Again, both 
acquisitions and new business as mechanism of 
growth  
Asano Around 1870, no previous political ties 
Initial fortune out of various investments. Growth 
through cooperation with separate financial 
institutions 
Fujita 
Origins: supplier of good and 
engineering works to the new 
government (with contacts to major 
figures in the Meiji government) 
An internal family feud led to the dissolution of 
this group and its reorganization as the Kuhara 
zaibatsu 
Okura 
Merchant (groceries) before the Meiji 
restoration; converted into gun 
production in 1860s and then into 
overseas trading starting 1873 
Growth mainly through acquisitions. Despite 
substantial operations overseas, government 
contracts remained major sources of income 
*the “big four” zaibatsu groups 
Source: R. Morck, M. Nakamura (2004, p. 116) 
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Appendix 2 
A Stylized Representation of a Z Control Pyramid 
Source: R. Morck, M. Nakamura (2004, p. 116) 
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Appendix 3  
Establishment of Public Enterprises, 1951-1969 
Sector Number of Enterprises 1951-1960 1961-1969 
Transportation and aviation 2 3 
Energy  3 
Mining 1 3 
Heavy and chemical 2 7 
Construction  2 
Monetary and banking  11 
Other 2 6 
Total 7 35 
*All newly established enterprises including those merged or reorganized under different firm names. 
Source: In Chul Kim, Mahn-Kee Kim and William W. Boyer (1994, p. 159) 
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Appendix 4 
Shareholders in the Populations of South Korea, Japan and the US 
 South Korea Japan United States 
 1986 1992 1985 1985 
Millions of people 1.1 10.0 20.4 47.0 
Percentage of population 2.6 23.0 17.0 20.0 
Source: In Chul Kim, Mahn-Kee Kim and William W. Boyer (1994, p. 162) 
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Appendix 5 
Divesture of Government Shares of Big Four 
Name Divested Shares Divesture Method 
POSCO  
(Oct., 2000) 
Government 3.1% 18.5%, DR (Dec. 98, Jul. 99, Sep. 00) 
KDB 23.6% 8.2%, stock repurchase (Dec. 99, Jun. 00, Oct. 00) 
Korea Heavy 
(Dec., 2000) 
KDB 31.2% 24%, IPO (Sep. 00) 
KEPCO 40.5% 36%, tender offer to Doosan group (Dec. 00) 11.7%, divesture of KEPCO shares (Dec. 01) 
KT&G  
(Oct., 2001) 
Government 28.8% 18%, IPO (Sep.00) 
KDB, IBK, KEXIM 
52.8% 
10%, EB (Dec. 00) 
19.8%, DR, EB (Oct. 01) 
19%, public offering, EB (Jun. 02) 
9.9%, DR (Oct. 02) 
4.6%, stock repurchase (Oct. 02) 
KT (May, 2002) Government 71.2% 
32.3%, DR (May 99, Jun. 01) 
29.5%, public offering (Jan. 01, May 02) 
11.8%, EB, BW (Dec. 01) 
Note: The month in the parenthesis in the first column indicates the month when government shares were fully divested. 
Source: Il Chong Nam and Woochan Kim (2004, p. 33) 
